<a target="_blank" href="Something that doesn't get said enough about 2-of-3 multisig escrow, whether you use a service or roll your own.In a multisig escrow, buyer, seller, and a third party (arbiter/operator) each generate a key, and the setup messages get relayed between you, often through the escrow's server. Here's the subtle risk: if that relay is malicious, it could hand you a different shared address than your counterparty actually helped create. one where the operator controls 2 of the 3 keys. You fund it, thinking it's a real 2-of-3 with your key in it, and it isn't.The fix is dead simple and costs nothing: after setup, both parties independently read off the shared deposit address and confirm they match, through your own channel. Same address on both sides = the setup is honest. Different = stop, don't fund.It's the multisig equivalent of comparing PGP fingerprints out of band. Cheap, and it turns "trust the operator not to tamper" into something you can actually check.Full disclosure: I run a Monero escrow service and we just built this address-comparison prompt into our multisig flow after a security pass.happy to go into the mechanics if useful. But the advice applies to any multisig escrow, not just ours." title="PSA for anyone using multisig escrow: verify the shared address out-of-band before you fund">full image</a>
<strong> - Repost: PSA for anyone using multisig escrow: verify the shared address out-of-band before you fund</strong> (<i>from Reddit.com, PSA for anyone using multisig escrow: verify the shared address out-of-band before you fund</i>)
<br><blockquote> Something that doesn't get said enough about 2-of-3 multisig escrow, whether you use a service or roll your own.In a multisig escrow, buyer, seller, and a third party (arbiter/operator) each generate a key, and the setup messages get relayed between you, often through the escrow's server. Here's the subtle risk: if that relay is malicious, it could hand you a different shared address than your counterparty actually helped create. one where the operator controls 2 of the 3 keys. You fund it, thinking it's a real 2-of-3 with your key in it, and it isn't.The fix is dead simple and costs nothing: after setup, both parties independently read off the shared deposit address and confirm they match, through your own channel. Same address on both sides = the setup is honest. Different = stop, don't fund.It's the multisig equivalent of comparing PGP fingerprints out of band. Cheap, and it turns "trust the operator not to tamper" into something you can actually check.Full disclosure: I run a Monero escrow service and we just built this address-comparison prompt into our multisig flow after a security pass.happy to go into the mechanics if useful. But the advice applies to any multisig escrow, not just ours. </blockquote>
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<hr><strong>Mining:</strong> <br>
<a title="Cryptotab browser" target="_blank" href="https://cryptotabbrowser.com/12/4000343"><u>Bitcoin</u>, Cryptotab browser</a>
- <a title="Pi Network, CLOUD PHONEMINING" target="_blank" href="https://minepi.com/cusidore"><u>Pi Network</u> cloud PHONE MINING</a>
<br><a title="Fone, CLOUD PHONE MINING" target="_blank" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.cloud.earning"><u>Fone</u>, cloud PHONE MINING</a> cod. dhvd1dkx
- <a title="Mintme, PC PHONE MINING" target="_blank" href="https://www.coinimp.com/invite/86d61388-18f9-4f8b-8561-8962c67e7166">Mintme, PC PHONE MINING</a>
<hr><strong>Exchanges:</strong> <br>
<a title="Coinbase.com" target="_blank" href="http://coinbase.com/join/occhip_8?src=android-link">Coinbase.com</a>
- <a title="Stex.com" target="_blank" href="https://stex.com/?ref=27877494">Stex.com</a>
- <a title="Probit.com" target="_blank" href="https://www.probit.com/r/46858290">Probit.com</a>
<hr><strong>Donations:</strong> <br>
<a title="Done crypto" target="_blank" href="https://commerce.coinbase.com/checkout/140e9bb6-c4ef-4156-92cf-9c87a88fd259">Done crypto</a>
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